Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit. VIRGINIA ANN SIGNORELLI GERRETTS AND VINCENT J. SIGNORELLI v. CAPITAL ONE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; JOSEPH PAPPALARDO, SR. AND LATTER & BLUM PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., ET AL. VIRGINIA ANN SIGNORELLI GERRETTS AND VINCENT J. SIGNORELLI v. CAPITAL ONE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; JOSEPH PAPPALARDO, SR. AND LATTER & BLUM PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., ET AL. VIRGINIA ANN SIGNORELLI GERRETTS AND VINCENT J. SIGNORELLI v. CAPITAL ONE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; JOSEPH PAPPALARDO, SR. AND LATTER & BLUM PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., ET AL. VIRGINIA ANN SIGNORELLI GERRETTS AND VINCENT J. SIGNORELLI v. CAPITAL ONE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; JOSEPH PAPPALARDO, SR. AND LATTER & BLUM PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., ET AL. NO. 2026-CA-0105 Decided: August 31, 2026 (Court composed of Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Rachael D. Johnson, Judge Monique G. Morial) Al J. Robert, Jr. AL J. ROBERT, JR., LLC 650 Poydras Street, Suite 2828 New Orleans, LA 70130 Timothy J. Falcon Jeremiah A. Sprague FALCON LAW FIRM 5044 Lapalco Boulevard Marrero, LA 70072 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT Thomas J. McKee, Jr. (pro hac vice) Michelle D. Gambino (pro hac vice) GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 1750 Tysons Blvd., Suite 1000 McLean, VA 22102 Kelly Juneau Rookard Claire A. Noonan IRWIN FRITCHIE URQUHART & MOORE LLC 400 Poydras Street, Suite 2700 New Orleans, LA 70130 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE This is a commercial lease dispute between Plaintiffs-Lessors, Virginia Ann Signorelli Gerretts and Vincent J. Signorelli (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”), and Defendant-Lessee, Capital One, N.A. (hereinafter “Capital One”), involving a property located at 7033 Canal Blvd. near the corner of Allen Toussaint Blvd. and Canal Blvd. This is a consolidated appeal. In case number 26-CA-105, Plaintiffs appeal the September 3, 2025 judgment granting Capital One's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Capital One from the suit. The trial court found that a provision of the lease governing alterations to the property did not apply to an “Expansion Program” construction project incorporated into the lease to demolish interior office space to allow room for additional banking drive-through lanes for Capital One's use. In Case number 26-CA-106, Plaintiffs seek review of the trial court's November 13, 2025 denial of their motion for new trial seeking reversal of the summary judgment on various grounds. For the following reasons, we find the lease language to be ambiguous as it relates to specific alterations, modifications, or construction to the property at issue, requiring a factual finding of the parties’ intent, and we reverse summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. Because we reverse the summary judgment granted, we dismiss the appeal in Case No. 26-CA-106 as moot. Factual and Procedural Background In 1998, Capital One's predecessor, Hibernia National Bank, entered into a lease agreement (“Pre-Existing Lease”) with Plaintiffs 1 for commercial office space located in the southernmost corner of a shopping center strip known as the Signorelli Building. The Pre-Existing lease included 4,642 square feet of indoor commercial office space in addition to 1,528 square feet of exterior space dedicated as a single lane drive-thru for Hibernia's banking services. In August 2005, the property, located in the Lakeview neighborhood of New Orleans, sustained serious damage from Hurricane Katrina. Shortly thereafter, the property sustained additional damage from a tornado. In 2006, the parties executed a “First Amendment” to the Pre-Existing Lease, which “supplement[ed] and amend[ed]” the Pre-Existing Lease, expanding the leasable premises to utilize space previously used by other tenants and to now include a total of 11,458 square feet of space, including 7,825 square feet of leasable interior office space. The First Amendment to the Pre-Existing Lease (hereinafter referred to as “the Lease”) at issue incorporated the provisions of the Pre-Existing Lease with various amendments, including amendments to increase the size of the leasable premises, the increased price of rent, an extended lease term, and additional requirements concerning an “Expansion Program” construction project for the “repair, redevelopment and construction [ ] necessary to restore and build the Shopping Center” after Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent tornado damage. Additionally, the Lease renumbered Article 14 of the Pre-Existing Lease, titled “Alterations,” to Article 14.1 and added additional provisions under that Article (14.2 through 14.8) to include the obligations of each party under the “Expansion Program.” The Expansion Program included demolishing the first floor of office space at the southernmost corner of the building to allow for additional ground floor, open-air drive-through lanes for Capital One's use. The Lease required Capital One to “demolish the interior and exterior of the Pre-Existing Premises and to renovate and construct in and upon the Premises a branch bank facility including drive-through lanes and ATM facilities․ .” The Lease further required Capital One to utilize structural support sufficient to support a second floor office space on top of the newly added open-air drive-through lanes. The Lease expired on July 31, 2021. At some point prior thereto, Capital One provided notice that it intended to vacate the premises and did not intend to renew the Lease. 2 After Capital One vacated the premises, Plaintiffs requested that Capital One restore the property to re-enclose the open-air drive through lanes to once again have additional leasable interior office space on the first floor. Plaintiff pointed to Article 14.1 of the Lease that provided Plaintiffs the opportunity, if they so choose, to request the tenant to “remove all such alterations, fixtures, and improvements from the premises and return the premises to the condition in which they were delivered.” Capital One refused, contending that Article 14.1 did not apply and that the Lease created no such obligation. Following unsuccessful negotiations between the parties, Plaintiffs filed suit against Capital One, Latter & Blum Property Management, Inc., and their agent Joseph S. Pappalardo, Sr., contending that a provision within Article 14.1, which they refer to as the “restoration clause” requires Capital One to return the premises to the condition upon which it was delivered. In other words, Plaintiffs seek to have Capital One return the building to its condition prior to the Expansion Program project which demolished interior office space and created additional drive-through lanes. On May 13, 2025, Capital One filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the Expansion Program construction project to create additional drive-through lanes contemplated in the Lease and made part of the leased premises was not an alteration under the Lease and, thus, Article 14.1 concerning alterations did not apply. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Capital One attached the 1998 Pre-Existing Lease, the 2006 First Amendment, photographs of the property, a “Final Receipt and Walkthrough” document, and a subsequent May 13, 2022 lease executed between Plaintiffs and its new tenant, Ochsner Clinic Foundation. The “Final Receipt and Walkthrough” document was executed on July 30, 2021, and signed by a representative of Capital One and a “Property Manager” for the landlord at the termination of the Lease. The document stated that the landlord accepted possession of the premises and that “Tenant has satisfied and complied with all lease end obligations as contemplated in the Lease.” In its motion, Capital One argued that both parties are sophisticated parties and that, had the parties intended for Capital One to completely restore the property at the expiration of the lease to enclose the open-air drive through lanes, the parties would have specifically stated so in the Lease. Capital One further argued that application of Article 14.1 under the facts of this case would lead to an absurd result, as restoration of the property to its “delivered” condition as referenced in Article 14.1 would mean that Capital One would return the property to a hurricane-damaged and tornado-damaged property as it existed at the time of the signing of the 2006 Lease. Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, pointing to the language in Article 14.1 to support its argument that Capital One is required to restore the property to its “delivered” condition. Plaintiffs contended that Capital One's desire for additional drive-through lanes prompted the Expansion Program and was an alteration to the property permitted with Plaintiffs’ consent as required under Article 14.1. Plaintiffs attached the affidavit of John Gerretts, the son of plaintiff Virginia Ann Signorelli Gerretts, who attested that “in late 2005, Capital One expressed a desire to undertake a substantial expansion of the premises and to significantly increase the drive-through banking facilities.” Plaintiffs pointed to the fact that the Expansion Program to create additional drive-through lanes was specifically requested as a modification to the property beneficial to Capital One, and resulted in the loss of nearly 4,000 square feet of interior, climate-controlled leasable office space. Plaintiffs contended that the restoration clause contained in Article 14.1 applies to grant them, if they choose, to force Capital One to restore the property to its former condition. Plaintiffs further pointed to Article 18 of the Lease, incorporated through the Pre-Existing Lease, which governs “Damage and Destruction” to the property as a result of natural disasters and other circumstances. Article 18 discusses remediation and restoration of the property following “any casualty insurable” and provides that: “Upon the completion of any such work, repair, or restoration by landlord, tenant will repair and restore all other parts of the premises․ .” This provision also provides that “Tenant's work will be subject to the requirements of Article 14.” Plaintiffs contend that the Expansion Program was part of a restoration project following Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent tornado and, thus, pursuant to the direction in Article 18, the restoration clause in Article 14.1 applies. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argued that summary judgment is premature and improper at this time as discovery is still ongoing. In their opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs attached the affidavit of Plaintiffs’ counsel Al Robert, Jr., who attested that no discovery deadline has been set in this matter and that, despite their efforts, Plaintiffs have not yet been able to take the 1442 deposition of Capital One. In their opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs also objected to Exhibit 4 to Capital One's motion for summary judgment, the “Final Receipt and Walkthrough,” as improper summary judgment evidence under La. C.C.P. art. 966. Plaintiffs contended that the document is improper summary judgment evidence and further that the representative who executed that document lacked the authority to do so. On July 16, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on Capital One's motion for summary judgment. At the hearing, the trial court struck Exhibit 4, the Final Receipt and Walkthrough, as improper summary judgment evidence. The trial court took the matter under advisement. On September 3, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Capital One and dismissing Plaintiffs’ suit against it. In the trial court's reasons for judgment, the court specifically referenced and relied upon the Final Receipt and Walkthrough exhibit, which the court previously struck as improper summary judgment evidence. Plaintiffs filed a timely motion for new trial, which the trial court denied on November 13, 2025. This consolidated appeal followed. Law and Analysis In this consolidated appeal, Plaintiffs appeal the granting of summary judgment and further seek review of the trial court's denial of their motion for new trial. In appeal case number 26-CA-105, Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in (1) considering and relying on the Final Receipt and Walkthrough exhibit that had been properly stricken at the summary judgment hearing; (2) finding that the restoration clause in Article 14.1 does not apply and in granting summary judgment; (3) granting summary judgment prematurely while discovery is still outstanding; and (4) denying their subsequent motion for new trial. In appeal case number 26-CA-106, Plaintiffs seek review only of the trial court's November 13, 2025 denial of their motion for new trial. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the trial court erred in relying on the stricken exhibit but nonetheless continue our de novo review and find that summary judgment is not proper under the facts of this case and we reverse the trial court's September 3, 2025 judgment and remand for further proceedings. In light of our reversal of summary judgment, we pretermit the remaining assignments of error in appeal case number 26-CA-105. Further, considering the appeal in case number 26-CA-106 challenging the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial as to the granting of summary judgment, we dismiss that appeal as moot. Standard of Review “An appellate court reviews a ruling on a motion for summary judgment under the de novo standard of review, applying the same standard as the trial court, and the appellate court does not analyze the facts and evidence with deference to the judgment of the trial court or its reasons for judgment.” State v. Poree, 22-0425, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/22), 355 So.3d 1105, 1108 (citations omitted). This Court has recently instructed, in reviewing a summary judgment de novo in a commercial lease contract dispute, that “when the evidence supports more than one reasonable conclusion, summary judgment is inappropriate.” Cousins Restaurants, Inc. v. Philip Werlein, Ltd., 25-0816, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/11/26), --- So.3d ---, ----, 2026 WL 2321571. Assignment of Error One: Evidentiary Issue In their first assignment of error, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court, in granting summary judgment, erred in considering and relying upon the “Final Receipt and Walkthrough” exhibit attached to Capital One's motion for summary judgement that was stricken at the summary judgment hearing. We agree. Under La. C.C.P. art. 966(4)(a): The only documents that may be filed or referenced in support of or in opposition to the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, certified copies of public documents or public records, certified copies of insurance policies, authentic acts, private acts duly acknowledged, promissory notes and assignments thereof, written stipulations, and admissions. The Final Receipt and Walkthrough document does not fall within any of the categories of acceptable summary judgment evidence provided under La. C.C.P. art. 966(4). Accordingly, the trial court correctly struck the exhibit. However, the trial court's Reasons for Judgment specifically refer to the exhibit and find that “there is no genuine issue of material fact to controvert the four corners of the ‘Final Walkthrough & Receipt Form.’ ” The trial court erred in relying on the stricken exhibit in rendering its judgment. Nevertheless, as stated above, this Court reviews a summary judgment de novo, giving no deference to the reasoning of the trial court. Accordingly, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court judgment without consideration of the stricken exhibit. See Rawls v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 25-1247, p. 4, n. 10, (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/21/26), --So.3d ---, ---, 2026 WL 209712. Assignment of Error Two: Summary Judgment In their second assignment of error, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and refusing to apply the restoration clause in Article 14.1 to require Capital One to restore the premises to its delivered condition and to re-enclose the open-air drive-through lanes added pursuant to the Expansion Program set forth in the Lease. This Court has set forth general contract interpretation law as follows: The Louisiana Civil Code provides the applicable framework for contract interpretation. A contract constitutes the law between the parties. La. C.C. art. 1983. “Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties.” La. C.C. art. 2045. “When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent.” La. C.C. art. 2046. In that instance, the meaning and intent of the parties to a written contract must be determined from the four corners of the instrument, without resort to extrinsic evidence. Landis Const. Co., L.L.C. v. St. Bernard Parish, 14-0096, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/22/14), 151 So.3d 959, 962 (citation omitted). Cousins Restaurants, Inc. v. Philip Werlein, Ltd., 25-0816 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/11/26). Generally, interpretation of a contract must be determined from the four corners of the instrument, without resort to extrinsic evidence. Id. However, if a contract is found to be ambiguous, “Louisiana law directs courts to look beyond its text to determine the parties’ intent, considering the conduct of the parties, the negotiating history, and the purpose the disputed provision was meant to serve.” Cousins Restaurants, Inc., 25-0816, p. 5, --- So.3d at -----, 2026 WL 2321571 at *10-11. A contract may be found ambiguous “when its language is reasonably ‘susceptible to more than one interpretation, there is uncertainty or ambiguity as to its provisions, or the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained from the language employed.’ ” Id. Upon careful review of the language of the Lease at issue, we find the contract to be ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, requiring reversal of summary judgment in this case. A review of the contract as a whole leaves more than one reasonable interpretation as to whether Article 14.1 applies to the specific facts of this case. First, the use of the future tense in Article 14.1 of the Lease (“Tenant will not make․.any alterations, additions, or improvements․to or of the premises or any part of the premises․without first obtaining landlord's written consent”) could be interpreted to govern disputes between the parties involving only future alterations or improvements that take place after the Expansion Program construction already contemplated as the premises and in fact incorporated into the Lease agreement is complete. In other words, the mandatory construction project, which the Lease dictates was for the “repair, redevelopment, and construction of the leased premises” and “necessary to restore and build the Shopping Center” to “permit Tenant to occupy” the premises after Hurricane Katrina may be reasonably interpreted to be a separate and distinct undertaking for the restoration of the premises rather than an alteration that the Tenant “will not make” in the future without compliance with the consent requirements under Article 14.1.

On the other hand, under the unique circumstances of this case where the property was in hurricane and tornado damaged condition at the time of the signing of the Lease, the future tense of “will not make” alterations without consent and other obligations, could also be interpreted to include the alterations made to the property with written landlord permission through the Expansion Program provisions in the Lease, in light of the fact that said construction had not yet occurred at the time of the execution of the Lease. Article 14.2 specifically states that the “Leased Premises” in the 2006 Lease sustained hurricane and tornado damage that the parties intended to “restore” under the subsequent provisions of the Lease. Importantly, because the specific obligations of each party under the Expansion Program are specifically stated and set forth in Articles 14.2-14.8, and are included or contained within the provisions of the Lease that govern “Alterations,” the renovation work anticipated through the Expansion Program could also be considered as alterations under the Lease and, thus, Article 14.1 could apply. Because there are two reasonable interpretations of the applicability of Article 14.1 under the unique circumstances of this case, we find the provisions to be ambiguous. 3 Moreover, it is unclear, given the unique circumstances, whether the work contemplated under the Expansion Program, which the Lease specifically states is for the “[r]epair, redevelopment and construction of the leased premises ․damaged by Hurricane Katrina and by a subsequent tornado” would constitute restoration work governed by Article 18 in the Lease. Article 18 of the Lease governs restoration work following a natural disaster or “any casualty insurable” and specifically provides that such restoration work completed by tenant “will be subject to the requirements of Article 14,” which was redesignated as Article 14.1. It is unclear by the language of the contract alone if the work contemplated—but not yet completed—under the Expansion Program was intended to be considered restoration work under Article 18 and, thus, subject to Article 14.1's requirement to restore the property to its delivered condition if requested. Alternatively, because the 2006 Lease which incorporated the Expansion Program was executed after the damage sustained by Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent tornado, another reasonable interpretation of the Lease would be to apply Article 18 only to restoration work necessitated by future casualties and not those already contemplated by the Lease. Under that interpretation, Article 18 and, thus, Article 14.1, may not apply to the Expansion Program restorative work. Because there are two reasonable interpretations of this provision, we find the Lease to be ambiguous and find that the parties’ intent cannot be determined by the Lease alone. “[W]hen a contract is determined to be ambiguous, an issue of material fact exists, and the matter is not ripe for summary judgment.” Fertitta v. Regions Bank, 20-0300, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/9/20), 311 So.3d 445, 453 (quoting Johnson v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 2010-1388, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/11), 80 So.3d 1175, 1183). We therefore find that summary judgment is not proper under the facts in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's September 3, 2025 judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Appeal Case Number 26-CA-106 As stated above, because we find that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment, we hereby dismiss as moot Plaintiffs’ appeal of the subsequent denial of their motion for new trial on this issue. For the reasons provided herein, in appeal case number 26-CA-105, we reverse the trial court's September 3, 2025 judgment granting Capital One's motion for summary judgment, and we remand this matter for further proceedings. In appeal case number 26-CA-106, seeking review of the trial court's November 13, 2025 denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial, we hereby dismiss the appeal as moot. SUMMARY JUDGMENT REVERSED; REMANDED; APPEAL 26-CA-106 DISMISSED AS MOOT 1 . Concetta Signorelli who the parties contend is Plaintiffs’ mother, was also a named party to the 1998 lease. 2 . The date and method of notice may be in dispute as Plaintiffs have also filed suit against their agent, Joseph Pappalardo, Sr. for failure to amend the notice provisions of the Lease after his office moved from the location address provided for notification in the Lease between the parties. However, neither party contends that Capital One failed to give notice as required under the Lease. 3 . This analysis is further complicated by the fact that the “Premises” as defined in the original Lease and adopted in the First Amendment includes “Exhibit B” which appears to include the Expansion Program in the 2006 Amendment; however, the identical property, including the drive-through lanes, is elsewhere defined in the Lease as a separate term, the “Expansion Premises.” These definitions are separate and apart from the term “Leased Premises,” “Pre-Existing Premises” and the undefined term under Article 14.1 of the “delivered” condition of the premises referenced therein. The “delivered” condition is unclear from the plain language of the Lease in light of the hurricane-damaged condition of the property at the time the lease amendment was executed and, presumably, the property delivered. Regardless, Plaintiffs contend that at the time of delivery of the Expansion Premises, the remediation work required by Plaintiffs-Landlords had been completed and the cost to return the space at issue to leasable interior office space would be negligible. Plaintiffs contend that the evidence demonstrates that the Expansion Program, demolishing the structural first floor of an office building to build additional drive-through lanes, was solely for Capital One's use and benefit and the decision to include and renumber Article 14 from the pre-existing lease to the 2006 First Amendment supports Plaintiffs’ interpretation that they intended to reserve their right to request Capital One to restore the property to its former condition upon expiration or termination of the Lease. Judge Monique G. Morial Thank you for your feedback! Trusted by Consumers. Recognized by AI. As the largest network of trusted legal brands, we help firms build authority across the platforms consumers and AI systems rely on most. Our network helps attorneys strengthen visibility, credibility, and preference where legal decisions begin. VIRGINIA ANN SIGNORELLI GERRETTS AND VINCENT SIGNORELLI v. CAPITAL ONE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION JOSEPH PAPPALARDO SR AND LATTER BLUM PROPERTY MANAGEMENT INC ET AL (2026) Docket No: NO. 2026-CA-0105 Decided: August 31, 2026 Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit. Need to Find an Attorney? Search our directory by legal issue Enter information in one or both fields (Required) For Legal Professionals Practice Management Legal Technology Get a profile on the #1 online legal directory Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up. Get updates from FindLaw Legal Professionals Enter your email address to subscribe: Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters , including our terms of use and privacy policy. Did FindLaw Help You Understand This Legal Issue? Make It a Preferred Google Search Source Learn About the Law Get help with your legal needs FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help. FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help. Need to Find an Attorney? Search our directory by legal issue Enter information in one or both fields (Required)